The False Legitimacy of Iran’s Komiteh-ye Emdad
Originally published on Muftah.org
Many Iranians experience the dichotomy of loving their land and hating its laws. As exiled Iranian author Azar Nafisi put it in her book Reading Lolita in Tehran, “Living in the Islamic Republic is like having sex with a man you loathe.”
The Iranian people, whether inside or outside the country, have never wholeheartedly complied with the norms of their Sharia-influenced government and remain conscious of Tehran’s all-encompassing corruption —which can execute someone over a facebook post or crash a child’s birthday party. To push back against this system and demonstrate their desire for change, Iranians often engage in displays of defiance. These acts of civil disobedience include micro-protests, like recent ones surrounding compulsory veiling or sharing dissenting content on social media.
Most recently, Iranians have been protesting against the Imam Khomeini Relief Committee. Known in Farsi as Komiteh-ye-Emdad, the charity organization continues to serve the purposes of the 1979 Revolution, which is when it was established. The goal of the organization is to increase Iranian influence in the region, mainly through humanitarian services. The Committee's visible corruption has, however, increasingly caused anger domestically and in the diaspora. Because it exploits religion and profits off of feelings of insecurity, Komiteh-ye-Emdad’s integrity has been questioned, even by the most indoctrinated of Iranians. However predisposed to their government’s deception they many have been, many Iranians were not prepared to learn where their generosity was going.
The History of Bonyads and Sadaqah
Almost a half-century following the establishment of the Islamic Republic in Iran, the Ulema — or Muslim clergy — are the sole arbiters of the political order.
According to Ali Saeidi, an assistant professor of sociology at the University of Tehran, the efforts of the Ulema to integrate religion with politics in Iran have been inconsistent. In particular, Saeidi argues that the religious charities or Bonyads established in post-revolutionary Iran — which were funded by assets seized from the ousted Shah— steadily evolved into private monopolies with no governmental regulation. Religious leaders were not inclined to apply the economic aspect of religious injunctions within governmental policies meaning the practices of Iran’s Bonyads are in accordance with the agenda of their respective directors, relieving the government of direct blame for potential corruption — whether or not that corruption benefits them as well.
Charity or Sadaqah, as often reiterated by Iranian leaders, is not only beneficial to those in need, but will also purify the Muslim’s heart from sin. Separate from the other Islamic principles of Zakat and Khums, Sadaqah is not thought of as an obligation but rather a voluntary act of charity.
Sadaqah contributions will continue as long as there are religious people with money to give. But even though citizens are becoming increasingly distant from Islam, the Ulema continues to push for Sadaqah contributions through public preaching, televised Imams, advertisements, and donation boxes.
Donation Boxes
These boxes, desperately concentrated and strategically placed along main roads and outside business, are noble efforts. They are often displayed with bright images of children and flowers. The most infamous variety is the blue and yellow octagon of the Imam Khomeini Relief Committee, also known as Komiteh-ye-Emdad, a Sadaqat-oriented foundation which receives government funding and generated 1200 billion Tomans (381 million USD) in 2017. A large portion of these funds come in the form of donations from Iran’s god-fearing and philanthropic citizens.
The charity and its assets are under the jurisdiction of Iran's supreme leader, Ali Khamenei. Its initial goal was to compensate the families of “martyrs” after the revolution and aid Shah-era political prisoners. Today, the stated mission is “to alleviate poverty and improve the self-sufficiency of needy people.”
In the past, the Relief Committee was criticized for dissuading its recipients from becoming involved in political matters, especially anti-government unrest during the 2009 election. The Committee also directed how people should vote during presidential elections, helping to bring about a second term for the disreputable President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.
Poverty Despite Charity
The charity does not seem to have reached those who are most in need of its help. “I had always thought I was doing my part for my country,” one Iranian expatriate recently shared with Muftah. “I was familiar with the poverty in Iran — I could see it every day, in the streets, on my way to work. [The beggars] are everywhere...So, I wanted to contribute to a trusted organization that could help them, instead of giving money to them directly which can be used to buy drugs.”
Iran has been ranked second in the world for opiate use.
Official statistics on the number of people below the poverty line in Iran have not been made public since 2007. Komiteh-ye-Emdad’s president, Parviz Fattah, recently claimed the number was 11 million. Fattah claimed that the number of applicants seeking assistance from the Imam Khomeini Relief Committee has gone up nearly 50 percent. Fattah did not specify since when. Although such numbers can be hard to gauge in a country like Iran — where there are no official census or polling systems in place and independent surveying organizations are regularly shut down, prominent economist Hossein Raghfar has estimated that 33 percent of Iran’s population, i.e. nearly 26 million people, are suffering from absolute poverty.
Many of these individuals have no source of support other than the bonyads. Earlier this year, the now-shuttered independent organization known as the Iranian Students Polling Agency found that nearly 75 percent of the 4,500 people they spoke with “expressed dissatisfaction with domestic affairs in the country.” In the last six months, Iran’s currency has plummeted, losing about 50 percent of its value, with the US dollar equaling about 85,000 rials in the open market. Small wonder, then, that an increasing number of people are relying on charities for relief.
Komiteh-ya-Emdad's International Involvement
It all started this year with a viral video of plentiful Iftar meals being distributed in Gaza under a banner featuring Komiteh-ye-Emdad’s emblem. There were large containers filled with poultry labeled as “presents” and words of gratitude expressed from Palestinian recipients toward Iran. “I appreciate this warm meal from our Iranian brothers” one man said, “I can’t thank Iran enough for the continuous and generous support for the Palestinian people.”
It had been reported that the Relief Foundation had distributed daily meals to 300,000 people in Gaza during Ramadan.
There are no official figures for how much financial support Iran has given Palestine, but Israeli Defence Minister Avigdor Lieberman claimed in March that most of the $260m Hamas invested in 2017 in making tunnels and weapons came from Iran.
These practices are a soft-power move in Iran’s proxy war with Israel which many Iranians feel like they don’t have the convenience of caring about. Instead of feeding the hungry and poor in Iran, or so the argument goes, Iran is using donations to help non-Iranians. For those Iranians who have adopted these views, anti-Palestinian and nationalistic views have abounded. During economically-fueled demonstrations this past June, protestors not only chanted “We don’t want the ayatollahs” and “Death to the dictator,” but also “Death to Palestine,” “No to Gaza, No to Lebanon, I Give My Life for Iran” and “Leave Syria and Think of Us.”
On his Instagram account, Parviz Fattah wrote that the money spent in Gaza came from donations given by Gazans themselves. Fattah also said that in Iran, there are, in fact, two kinds of charity boxes, one for the country’s poor and one for Palestine. There have been no proof for such claims. They are, however, part of broader funding efforts aimed at non-Iranian populations, including
hundreds of thousands of people in Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Lebanon, Tajikistan, Iraq, Syria, Somalia, Pakistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Chechnya.
The Secretary General of Lebanon’s Shi’a militant group Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah, has openly acknowledged the Imam Khomeini Relief Committee’s branch in South Lebanon as part of Hezbollah. Indeed, in a 2016 speech, Nasrallah said that “The budgets for food, arms, and missiles of Hezbollah are all supplied by the Islamic Republic of Iran. As long as Iran has money, we have money.” Estimates of Iran’s funding for the Lebanese group reach anywhere from $60 million to $1 billion a year.
Neighboring Syria is another base for the Relief Committee. According to the Committee itself, in 2006, it spent roughly 957,000 USD in Syria. These costs include — in addition to monthly pensions to the poor — medical expenses, marriage expenses, and non-cash goods.
In June, the hashtag نه به كميته امداد#, which translates to “No to Komiteh-ye-Emdad” took off and videos of Iranians smashing, burning, throwing away, and taking the money out of their donation boxes started circulating. It has been rumored that contributions to the foundation have reached an all- time low. At the same time, the population’s frustrations have reached an all-time high.
According to Maziar Bahari, editor of Iranwire.com, “Many Iranians regard their government’s generous help to the Palestinian Hamas, Lebanese Hezbollah, Syrian Assad regime and Yemeni Houthis as unnecessary and even treasonous.”
Conclusion
The Imam Khomeini Relief Committee is a product of the Islamic Revolution of 1979 and continues to serve its political purposes. The information Komiteh-ye-Emdad's provides about its work is limited to vague language on its state-sanctioned website. Its activities in Tajikistan have also been suspended due to violations, according to an official source at the Ministry of Justice of Tajikistan, who did not reveal specifics.
It is not only the deceptive rhetoric employed within Iranian borders but the attempts at establishing loyalty in foreign countries of interest (through the provision of services) which makes the organisation part of the larger goal to increase Shi’a fundamentalism as well as Iranian loyalty and influence within the region.
The Iranian people, with generations-worth of resiliency against the corruption of their government, have adapted accordingly through two regime changes, economic sanctions, and evidently, increasing poverty levels. The conflicting position of Iranians who believe in global welfare yet have lost faith in the prosperity of their country is a harsh reality that must be confronted. For Komiteh-ye-Emdad’s donors, the answer is easy —it is safe to assume they’ll tell you that their charity begins at home.